Metaphysics is one of the principal works of Aristotle and the first major work of the branch of philosophy with the same name. The principal subject is "being qua being", or being understood as being. It examines what can be asserted about anything that exists just because of its existence and not because of any special qualities it has. Also covered are different kinds of causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical objects, and a prime-mover God.

Book V Chapter 242015-05-24
To come from something means (1) to come from something as from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect of the highest genus or in respect of the lowest species; e. g. In a sense all things that can be melted come from water, but in a sense the statue comes from bronze. -(2) As
Book V Chapter 252015-05-24
Part means (1) (a) that into which a quantum can in any way be divided; for that which is taken from a quantum qua quantum is always called a part of it, e. g. two is called in a sense a part of three. It means (b), of the parts in the first sense, only those which measure the whole; th
Book V Chapter 262015-05-23
A whole means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in two senses-either as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity bet
Book V Chapter 272015-05-23
It is not any chance quantitative thing that can be said to be mutilated; it must be a whole as well as divisible. For not only is two not mutilated if one of the two ones is taken away (for the part removed by mutilation is never equal to the remainder), but in general n
Book V Chapter 282015-05-22
The term race or genus is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is continuous, e. g. while the race of men lasts means while the generation of them goes on continuously. -(2) It is used with reference to that which first broug
Book V Chapter 292015-05-22
The false means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e. g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side or that you are sitting; for one of these is false always, and the oth
Book V Chapter 302015-05-21
Accident means (1) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually, e. g. If some one in digging a hole for a plant has found treasure. This-the finding of treasure-is for the man who dug the hole an accident; for neither does the one com
Book VI Chapter 12015-05-21
WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at a
Book VI Chapter 22015-05-20
But since the unqualified term being has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true (non-being being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e. g. the what, quality, quantity, place,
Book VI Chapter 32015-05-20
That there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. W
Book VI Chapter 42015-05-19
Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently determined its nature. But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgem
Book VII2015-05-19
THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense the being meant is what a thing is or a this, and in another sense it means a quality
Book VII Chapter 22015-05-18
Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of p
Book VII Chapter 32015-05-18
The word substance is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated
Book VII Chapter 42015-05-17
Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se. For being you is not
Book VII Chapter 52015-05-17
It is a difficult question, if one denies that a formula with an added determinant is a definition, whether any of the terms that are not simple but coupled will be definable. For we must explain them by adding a determinant. E. g. there is the nose, and concavity, and snubness, which is compounded o
Book VII Chapter 62015-05-16
We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing. Now in the case of accidental unities th
Book VII Chapter 72015-05-16
Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something. And the something which I say it comes to be may be found in any category; it may come to be eit
Book VII Chapter 82015-05-15
Since anything which is produced is produced by something (and this I call the starting-point of the production), and from something (and let this be taken to be not the privation but the matter; for the meaning we attach to this has already been explained), and since something is produced (and this
Book VII Chapter 92015-05-15
The question might be raised, why some things are produced spontaneously as well as by art, e. g. health, while others are not, e. g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the matter which governs the production in the making and producing of any work of art, and in which a part of the product is
Book VII Chapter 102015-05-14
Since a definition is a formula, and every formula has parts, and as the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula to the part of the thing, the question is already being asked whether the formula of the parts must be present in the formula of the whole or not. For in some cases the for
Book VII Chapter 112015-05-14
Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to define any thing; for definition is of the universal and of the form. If then it is not evident what sort of parts
Book VII Chapter 122015-05-13
Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not treated of it in the Analytics; for the problem stated in them is useful for our inquiries concerning substance. I mean this problem:-wherein can consist the unity of that, the formula of which we call a definition, as for instance, in t
Book VII Chapter 132015-05-13
Let us return to the subject of our inquiry, which is substance. As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these are called substance, so also is the universal. About two of these we have spoken; both about the essence and about the substratum, of which we have said that it underlies in
Book VII Chapter 142015-05-12
It is clear also from these very facts what consequence confronts those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate existence, and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and animal is present in man and &l